Public Goods and Tax Competition in a Two-Sided Market
Public Goods and Tax Competition in a Two-Sided Market
复制标题
双边市场中的公共产品和税收竞争
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1265539
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Konstantinos Serfes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Christos Kotsogiannis;Konstantinos Serfes
税收竞争文献中一个相当被忽视的问题是，均衡结果依赖于企业和购物者的存在(双边市场)。利用纵向和横向分化模型，司法管辖区通过提供公共产品和征税来竞争，以吸引企业和购物者，本文刻画了非合作均衡。它还评估了一项广受欢迎的税收协调政策对司法管辖区的福利影响：征收最低税率。研究表明，两个市场的相互作用影响着税收竞争的强度和竞争管辖区选择的最优垂直分化程度。尽管非合作均衡是低效的，就像通常的情况一样，但两个市场的相互作用的强度缓解了这种低效。当相互作用强度较弱时，最低税收政策是有效的，当互动强度较大时，最低税收政策无效。
A rather neglected issue in the tax competition literature is the dependence of equilibrium outcomes on the presence of firms and shoppers (two-sided markets). Making use of a model of vertical and horizontal differentiation, within which jurisdictions compete by providing public goods and levying taxes in order to attract firms and shoppers, this paper characterizes the non-cooperative equilibrium. It also evaluates the welfare implications for the jurisdictions of a popular policy of tax coordination: The imposition of a minimum tax. It is shown that the interaction of the two markets affects the intensity of tax competition and the degree of optimal vertical differentiation chosen by the competing jurisdictions. Though the non-cooperative equilibrium is, as it is typically the case, inefficient such inefficiency is mitigated by the strength of the interaction in the two markets. A minimum tax policy is shown to be effective when the strength of the interaction is weak and ineffective when it is strong.
影响因子：
1.3
作者：
Choi, Jay Pil
通讯作者：
Choi, Jay Pil