Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
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DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.008
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发表时间：
2009-05-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Takizawa, Hirokazu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kawagoe, Toshiji;Takizawa, Hirokazu
我们给出了具有私人信息的廉价谈话游戏的实验结果。在解释我们的实验数据时，我们系统地比较了各种均衡精化理论和有限理性模型，如Level-k分析。与以前的文献一样，我们发现当发送者和接收者之间的利益一致时，经常会出现信息交流。虽然在利益冲突的情况下，喋喋不休的均衡游戏更常见，但相当多的玩家倾向于选择诚实和轻信的游戏。我们还发现，k水平分析在解释这一现象方面优于均衡精炼理论。我们的研究结果也证实了传播学理论中所报道的“真相偏差”和“真相检测偏差”的存在。(C)2008 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。
We present the experimental results of cheap-talk games with private information. We systematically compare various equilibrium refinement theories and bounded rationality models such as level-k analysis in explaining our experimental data. As in the previous literature, we find that when interests between sender and receiver are aligned, informative communication frequently arises. While babbling equilibrium play is observed more frequently in conflicting interest cases, a substantial number of players tend to choose truth-telling and credulous play. We also find that level-k analysis outperforms equilibrium refinement theories in explaining this phenomenon. Our results also confirm the existence of the "truth bias" and "truth-detection bias" reported in communication theory. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.