Contributions in linear public goods experiments with stranger matching: two motivations
Contributions in linear public goods experiments with stranger matching: two motivations
复制标题
陌生人匹配线性公共物品实验的贡献：两个动机
DOI：
10.1080/00036846.2018.1489517
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Katsuhiko Nishizaki & Takafumi Yamakawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tsuyoshi Nihonsugi;Hiroshi Nakano;Katsuhiko Nishizaki & Takafumi Yamakawa
我们研究了为什么在一个线性公共产品博弈中，受试者会为公共产品做出贡献。在这个实验中，受试者被要求确定他们对公共利益的贡献，以及他们对伴侣贡献的看法。此外，受试者还被要求在真实的时间内记录他们做出决定的原因。我们使用被试的描述进行编码分析，这是一种动机的分类方法。整合这种编码方法和行为数据显示，充分的贡献是两个动机的结果。一种是实现社会最优结果的条件合作动机。另一个动机是通过发出自己的行为信号，引导其他群体成员在接下来的时期贡献他们所有的禀赋（即教学动机）。该研究进一步揭示了这两个确定的动机在驱动合作行为中起着关键作用，其他动机（如困惑和利他主义）起着次要作用。
We investigated why subjects contribute to the public good in a linear public goods game with stranger matching. In this experiment, subjects were asked to determine their contributions to the public good and also their beliefs about their partners’ contributions. Additionally, the subjects were asked to note the reason for their decisions in real time. We used the subjects’ descriptions for a coding analysis, which is a classification method of the motivations. Integrating this coding methodology and behavioural data revealed that full contributions are the result of two motives. One is the conditional cooperation motive to achieve the socially optimal outcome. The other is the motive to lead the other group member to contribute all of their endowment in the following periods by signalling one’s own act (i.e. a teaching motive). The study further reveals that the two identified motives play a key role in driving cooperative behaviour, and that other motives (such as confusion and altruism) play a minor role.