A theory of endogenous institutional change
A theory of endogenous institutional change
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DOI：
10.1017/s0003055404041395
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发表时间：
2004-11-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Laitin, DD
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Greif, A;Laitin, DD
本文提出了以下问题：(a)制度变化的原因和方式，(b)制度如何在不断变化的环境中持续存在，以及(c)制度释放的过程如何导致其自身的灭亡。本文表明，博弈论的自我强制均衡概念和历史制度主义对过程的关注都不足以回答这些问题。本文建立在博弈论的基础上，但回应了历史制度主义者对博弈论的批评，引入了准参数和自我强化的概念。有了这些概念，并以重复博弈论为基础，提供了一种研究制度的动态方法，这种方法可以解释制度的内生变化（和稳定性）。近代早期欧洲正式治理机构的背景描述和当代世界分裂结构的非正式制度为这种方法提供了例证。
This paper asks (a) why and how institutions change, (b) how an institution persists in a changing environment, and (c) how processes that it unleashes lead to its own demise. The paper shows that the game-theoretic notion of self-enforcing equilibrium and the historical institutionalist focus on process are both inadequate to answer these questions. Building on a game-theoretic foundation, but responding to the critique of it by historical institutionalists, the paper introduces the concepts of quasi-parameters and self reinforcement. With these concepts, and building on repeated game theory, a dynamic approach to institutions is offered, one that can account for endogenous change (and stability) of institutions. Contextual accounts of formal governing institutions in early modern Europe and the informal institution of cleavage structure in the contemporary world provide illustrations of the approach.