Collusion and discrimination in organizations
Collusion and discrimination in organizations
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jet.2003.07.002
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发表时间：
2004-06-01
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Ishiguro, S
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ishiguro, S
在委托人-多代理人环境下，研究了当代理人合谋时，在相对绩效评价下，最优契约应如何修改。代理人可能会写侧合同，这是不依赖于他们的努力选择，但间接控制他们通过侧转移。我们证明，最佳的防共谋合同是引入“歧视性政策”，即向代理人提供的工资计划取决于他们的身份，即使他们的生产能力相同。这种歧视性的工资计划解释了“分而治之”的组织战略，作为对勾结的最佳反应。(C)2003年爱思唯尔公司All rights reserved.
In a principal-multi-agent setting we investigate how optimal contracts should be modified under relative performance evaluation when agents collude. Agents may write side-contracts, which are not contingent on their effort choices but indirectly control them through side-transfers. We show that the optimal collusion-proof contract is to introduce a "discriminatory policy" in the sense that the wage schemes offered to agents depend oil their identities even if they are identical with respect to productive abilities. Such discriminatory wage schemes explain the organizational strategy of "divide and conquer" as an optimal response to collusion. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.