A Lindahl Solution to International Emissions Trading
A Lindahl Solution to International Emissions Trading
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作者：
Y. Nishimura
我们认为，全球污染水平的国际谈判，并检查林达尔解决方案，确定分配的污染许可证一致同意。我们展示了各种属性，以澄清困难，实现帕累托有效分配的协议。林达尔解决方案可能会导致不公平的分配，它不属于$\gamma$-核心的其他解决方案的基础上排放交易。另一方面，我们提供的机制，实现林达尔解决方案作为子博弈完美均衡。我们还认为，市场与区域特定的价格作为一种手段，以诱导次优帕累托有效配置。
We consider international negotiations on the level of global pollution, and examine the Lindahl solution which determines the distribution of the pollution permits with unanimous agreement. We show various properties to clarify difficulties to achieve a Pareto efficient allocation as an agreement. The Lindahl solution may result in an unfair allocation, and it does not belong to the $\gamma$-core as in other solutions based on emissions trading. On the other hand, we provide mechanisms that implement the Lindahl solution as the subgame-perfect equilibrium. We also consider the market with region-specific prices as a device to induce second-best Pareto efficient allocations.