Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection
Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection
复制标题
逆向选择的串通与集团借贷
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.250771
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Laffont
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Laffont
在收益相关的环境下，本文刻画了银行面临逆向选择、借款人承担有限责任时的最优借贷契约。团体贷款合同被证明是由披露机制主导的，这种机制不使用合作伙伴业绩的事后可观察性。然而，当允许借款人在完全信息下串通时，团体借贷合同在简单披露机制(仅获得借款人自己的私人信息)类中是最优的，并且对于扩展的披露机制仍然有用。
In an environment with correlated returns, this paper characterizes optimal lending contracts when the bank faces adverse selection and borrowers have limited liability. Group lending contracts are shown to be dominated by revelation mechanisms which do not use the ex post observability of the partners' performances. However, when collusion between borrowers under complete information is allowed, group lending contracts are optimal in the class of simple revelation mechanisms (which elicit only the borrower's own private information) and remain useful with extended revelation mechanisms.