The Political Economy of Local Labor Control in the Philippines*
The Political Economy of Local Labor Control in the Philippines*
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菲律宾地方劳工管制的政治经济学*
DOI：
10.1111/j.1944-8287.2001.tb00153.x
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发表时间：
2001
影响因子：
7
通讯作者：
P. Kelly
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Kelly
在边缘资本主义地区，劳动力市场过程经常表现为控制空间的国际资本对丰富、廉价和局限于当地的劳动力的直接剥削。大量的文献涉及发展中国家快速工业化地区的国家劳动法规制度和工人受压制的主体性。然而，在这些地方以地方规模运作的复杂监管机构并没有像工业化国家的劳动力市场那样受到同样敏感的关注，近年来对劳动力市场的研究取得了相当大的进展。在本文中，我试图解决这种差异，专注于机构和参与者在菲律宾的快速工业化的网站创建一个地方劳动力控制制度。这些人包括国家、企业投资者、个体工人、工业园区管理公司、招聘机构、村庄和社区领导人、市政官员、省政府和劳工组织。在探讨这些不同参与者之间的关系时，我提出了两个论点。首先，体现在新兴工业化地区的劳动过程中的关系不能简单地被视为“全球”资本与“本地”劳动之间的对立。相反，这里所描述的各种各样的当地参与者起到了调解这种关系的作用，并将特定的全球资本嵌入到权力关系的当地政治经济中。第二，这些地方化的关系往往存在于正式的监管机构之外，甚至可能直接与之相抵触。通过这种方式，当地劳动力控制制度中采用的机制往往比正式监管机构的分析所揭示的更为非正式，更具流动性，更具地域可变性。
Abstract Labor market processes in sites of peripheral capitalism are all too frequently represented as the straightforward exploitation of abundant, cheap, and place-bound labor by space-controlling international capital. Extensive literatures exist that deal with national regimes of labor regulation and the subjugated subjectivities of workers in locations of rapid industrialization in the developing world. The complex regulating institutions operating at a local scale in such sites have not, however, received the same sensitive attention as labor markets in the industrialized world, on which research has advanced considerably in recent years. In this paper I seek to address that discrepancy by focusing on the institutions and actors involved in creating a local labor control regime in a site of rapid industrialization in the Philippines. These include the national state, corporate investors, individual workers, industrial estate management companies, recruitment agencies, village and community leaders, municipal officials, provincial governments, and labor organizations. In exploring the relationship between these various players I develop two arguments. First, the relationship embodied in the labor process of newly industrializing spaces cannot be conceived simply as an antagonism between “global” capital and “local” labor. Instead, the wide range of local players described here act to mediate that relationship and to embed specific global capitals in a local political economy of power relations. Second, these localized relationships often exist outside of formal regulatory institutions, and indeed may directly contravene them. In this way the mechanisms employed in the local labor control regime are frequently more informal, more fluid, and more geographically variable than an analysis of formal regulatory institutions would reveal.