The Declining Value of Revolving‐Door Lobbyists: Evidence from the American States
The Declining Value of Revolving‐Door Lobbyists: Evidence from the American States
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旋转门游说者的价值下降：来自美洲各州的证据
DOI：
10.1111/ajps.12485
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
James M. Strickland
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
James M. Strickland
“旋转门”游说者是从政府职位过渡到为私人实体游说的个人。这些游说者依靠他们在政府工作期间积累的内部关系和政治知识而茁壮成长。这些资产使前立法者能够更多地接触现任立法者并对其施加影响。然而，他们的关系和知识的价值取决于前同事是否留在立法机构。随着新的立法者进入议会，前成员的关系和知识到期并失去价值。虽然营业额或议会规模的增加会产生更多可能进行游说的前议员，但这种增加会对前议员作为游说者的价值产生负面影响。因此，利益集团雇用的前立法者也就少了。其他因素，如较长的冷却期或增加立法工作人员资源，对周转率产生轻微或没有实质性影响。立法特点主要决定了前立法者的周转率。
‘‘Revolving‐door” lobbyists are individuals who transition from governmental positions into lobbying for private entities. Such lobbyists thrive on the insider connections and political knowledge that they developed while in government. These assets afford former lawmakers more access to and influence over incumbent lawmakers. The value of their connections and knowledge, however, is contingent on former colleagues remaining within the legislature. As new legislators enter the assembly, the connections and knowledge of former members expire and lose value. Whereas increases in turnover or assembly size generate more former lawmakers who might lobby, such increases negatively affect former members’ value as lobbyists. Interest groups accordingly hire fewer former legislators to lobby. Other factors, such as longer cooling‐off periods or increased legislative staff resources, produce slight or no substantive effects on rates of revolving. Legislative characteristics mostly determine rates of revolving for former lawmakers.