When Protection Collapses: Post-Demobilization Trajectories of Violence
When Protection Collapses: Post-Demobilization Trajectories of Violence
复制标题
当保护崩溃时：复员后的暴力轨迹
DOI：
10.1080/09546553.2014.955916
复制
发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
K. Howe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Enzo Nussio;K. Howe
开展建设和平活动，包括非国家非法行为者的复员，并不一定会减少暴力。虽然有几种理论探讨了持续暴力的原因，但很少有理论能充分解释为什么在复员后暴力率会迅速上升。本文采用过程追踪的方法，探讨了哥伦比亚科尔多瓦省的情况，那里的暴力率增加后，准军事集团（哥伦比亚联合自卫军[AUC]）在2005年复员。我们认为，AUC在其多年的运作中创造并维持了一个垄断性的非法保护系统，这种类型的地方秩序能够遏制暴力。复员后，保护制度被破坏，因此，复员后犯罪组织之间对现有非法租金展开了新的竞争，轻微犯罪变得普遍，报复性杀人激增，从而导致复员后期间暴力事件增加。我们关于保护崩溃的理论在哥伦比亚其他AUC占主导地位的地区找到了支持。
The implementation of peacebuilding activities, including the demobilization of non-state illegal actors, does not necessarily bring about a reduction in violence. While there are several theories that address the causes of persistent violence, there are few that adequately explain why rates of violence can rapidly increase in a post-demobilization context. Using the method of process tracing, this article explores the case of Córdoba Department, Colombia, where rates of violence have increased after the demobilization of paramilitary groups (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia [AUC]) in 2005. We argue that the AUC created and maintained a monopolistic illegal protection system during its years of operation, and this type of local order was able to contain violence. After demobilization, the protection system was disrupted and as a consequence, new competition between post-demobilization criminal organizations for existing illegal rents developed, petty crime became pervasive, and revenge killings spiked, thus contributing to increased rates of violence in the post-demobilization period. Our theory about the breakdown of protection finds support in other AUC-dominated regions of Colombia.