Japan's Postwar Party Politics Masaru Kohno Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, pp. xii, 172
Japan's Postwar Party Politics Masaru Kohno Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, pp. xii, 172
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日本战后政党政治 小野胜 普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1997 年，第 xii 页，172
DOI：
10.1017/s0008423900016656
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Leonard J. Schoppa
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作者：
Leonard J. Schoppa
那么西方应该怎么做呢？Crnobrnja主张在美国的指导下扩大军事存在，并由欧洲主导重建资金。他警告说，另一种选择可能是在波斯尼亚境内和上空爆发一场新的战争，其后果将更广泛，许多人已经通过冲突发出警告。他这样做是对的。巴尔干半岛到处都是软弱和分裂的国家，阿尔巴尼亚最近的崩溃就突显了这一点。如果说有什么不同的话，那就是溢出的风险增加了。与此同时，美国已经厌倦了其在欧洲安全中的领导角色，而在欧洲各国首都，预算严格已成为口头禅。总体情况并不令人鼓舞。南斯拉夫戏剧的优点很多。提交人是一名从业者，是前南斯拉夫外交官，曾在布鲁塞尔代表该国，对卷入冲突的各机构的运作有着敏锐的洞察力。他本人是塞尔维亚人，他严厉谴责那些滥用社区民族主义的塞尔维亚精英成员，他们不顾一切地努力在冷战后的欧洲保持专业的漂浮。然后，他可信地写道，类似的担忧如何在南斯拉夫的其他共和国上演，以及为什么必须分担国家崩溃的责任，甚至在一定程度上分担随之而来的暴行。他令人信服地摒弃了一个在西方国家政府为参与的成本和条件而苦恼时经常被抛来抛去的论点。对茨诺布日纳来说，这里并不存在巴尔干半岛的民族自大狂，包括无法消除的怨恨和野蛮行为，每当该地区的社区从上级武力的控制下解放出来时，他们就会屈服于这种自大狂。不太专业的南斯拉夫观察家将不得不阅读这本书与年表，地图供应（大于这里提供的三个）和谁是谁。除此之外，最后几章的编辑是不合标准的，分析有时是模棱两可的。这方面的一个主要例子可以在有关蒂托元帅的业绩和遗产的段落中找到。这位南斯拉夫领导人是勇敢地面对约瑟夫·斯大林，还是被赶出了新兴的共产主义集团？他是一个有创造力的爱国者还是一个官僚主义的机会主义者？他在他的国家的解体中到底扮演了什么角色？但这些都是很难回答的问题，米哈伊洛·茨诺布尔尼亚并不是第一个没有完全理解这些问题的人。
So what should the West do? Crnobrnja advocates an extended military presence under United States direction and European-led financing of reconstruction. He warns that the alternative could be a new war in and over Bosnia, with the wider consequences of which many have warned through the conflict. He is right to do so. The Balkans are full of weak and fractured states, as Albania's recent collapse underlines. If anything, the risk of overspill has increased. At the same time, the US has been tiring of its leadership role in European security, while in European capitals budgetary rigour has become the mantra. The big picture is not encouraging. The strong points of The Yugoslav Drama are many. The author is a practitioner, a former Yugoslav diplomat who represented his country in Brussels, and who has keen insight into the workings of the various institutions that have been involved in the conflict. Himself a Serb, he castigates those members of the Serb elite who misused their community's nationalism in a desperate effort to stay professionally afloat in post-Cold War Europe. He writes then with credibility about how similar concerns were played out in Yugoslavia's other republics, and why the responsibility for the country's breakdown and, in part, even the atrocities that came in its wake, has to be shared. He dispenses convincingly with an argument that was often tossed about in the West as its governments agonized over the cost and terms of engagements. For Crnobrjna, there is no Balkan national megalomania, including indelible grudges and bestial behaviour, to which communities of the area succumb whenever they are released from the containing grip of superior force. Less than expert Yugo-watchers will have to read the book in tandem with a chronology, a supply of maps (larger than the three provided here) and a who's who. Beyond that, the editing in the final chapters is substandard and the analysis is sometimes ambiguous. A prime example of this can be found in the passages relating to Marshal Tito's track record and legacy. Did the Yugoslav leader stand up to Joseph Stalin or was he pushed out of the emerging communist bloc? Was he a creative patriot or an apparatchik-opportunist? And what was really his part in the dissolution of his country? But these are hard questions, and Mihailo Crnobrnja is not the first to fail to come completely to grips with them.