Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others
Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others
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DOI：
10.1017/s0003055406062083
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发表时间：
2006-05
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Torben Iversen;D. Soskice
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Torben Iversen;D. Soskice
标准的再分配政治经济学模型，特别是 Meltzer 和 Richard（1981）的模型，未能解释民主国家之间政府再分配的显着差异。我们开发了一个一般的再分配模型，解释了为什么一些民主政府比其他政府更容易进行再分配。我们表明，选举制度发挥着关键作用，因为它决定了政党的性质和执政联盟的组成，从而决定了重新分配。我们的论点意味着（1）在民联制度下，中左政府占主导地位，而在多数制度下，中右政府占主导地位； (2)公关制度比多数制度具有更多的再分配能力。我们用先进民主国家的再分配、政府党派之争和选举制度的面板数据来检验我们的论点。
Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard (1981), fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies. We develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others. We show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions, hence redistribution. Our argument implies (1) that center-left governments dominate under PR systems, whereas center-right governments dominate under majoritarian systems; and (2) that PR systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems. We test our argument on panel data for redistribution, government partisanship, and electoral system in advanced democracies.