Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security: Nixon, India, and the Ties That Bind
Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security: Nixon, India, and the Ties That Bind
复制标题
证券化、社会认同和民主安全：尼克松、印度和相互联系的纽带
作者：
J. Hayes
民主和平是国际关系研究中最连贯和最可识别的项目之一。然而，尽管对这一主题进行了大量的研究，并声称其具有法律般的性质，但民主和平仍然是一个备受争议的发现。在很大程度上，这一立场源于一个长期存在的问题：究竟是什么让民主国家不打仗？本文借鉴哥本哈根学派的安全化理论和社会心理学，认为民主和平的关键机制在于决策者与公众之间的政治连接点。我认为，公众的民主身份，植根于基本的民主规范必不可少的任何民主的功能在任何时候，在美国的安全和外交政策的建设中发挥着独立的作用。为了验证这一论点，我考察了1971年孟加拉国战争的困难案例，当时理查德·尼克松总统将美国企业号航空母舰群派往孟加拉湾。对公开声明和政府文件的分析表明，虽然尼克松和国家安全顾问亨利基辛格积极地将印度视为对美国利益的威胁，但他们认为公众不会接受关于民主国家的安全论点。
Abstract The Democratic Peace stands as one of the most coherent and recognizable programs of study in international relations. Yet despite the pages of research devoted to the subject and claims about its law-like nature, the democratic peace remains a highly contested finding. In large part, this contestation arises out of an enduring question: What exactly keeps democracies from fighting? Drawing on the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School as well as social psychology, this article claims that a critical mechanism of the democratic peace lies at the political junction between policymakers and the public. I argue that the democratic identity of the public, grounded in basic democratic norms essential for the function of any democracy at any time, plays an independent role in the construction of security and foreign policy in the United States. To test the argument, I examine the difficult case of the 1971 Bangladesh War, when President Richard Nixon sent the USS Enterprise carrier group to the Bay of Bengal. Analysis of public statements as well as administration documentation reveals that, while Nixon and national security advisor Henry Kissinger actively saw India as a threat to U.S. interests, they were constrained by their belief that the public would not accept a security argument with respect to a fellow democracy.