Fast and practical secret key extraction by exploiting channel response
Fast and practical secret key extraction by exploiting channel response
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DOI：
10.1109/infcom.2013.6567117
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发表时间：
2013-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Hongbo Liu;Yan Wang;J. Yang;Yingying Chen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hongbo Liu;Yan Wang;J. Yang;Yingying Chen
在动态移动的环境中，由于无线介质的共享特性和缺乏固定的密钥管理基础设施，安全的无线通信仍然具有挑战性。因此，使用物理层信息来生成密钥已经引起了人们的广泛关注，以补充传统的基于密码的方法。虽然最近的工作已经证明，基于接收信号强度（RSS）的密钥提取是实用的，现有的基于RSS的密钥生成技术在很大程度上限制在他们产生的秘密比特的速率，并主要适用于移动的无线网络。在本文中，我们表明，利用多个正交频分复用（OFDM）子载波的信道响应可以提供细粒度的信道信息，并实现更高的比特生成速率的静态和移动的情况下，在现实世界的场景。我们进一步发展了一个信道增益互补（CGC）辅助的密钥提取方案，以科普在实践中遇到的信道非互易性。在室内和室外环境下的WiFi网络实验表明，该方法可以显著提高60 ~ 90 bit/packet的秘密比特生成速率，并且能够抵御对基于RSS的技术有害的恶意攻击，包括可预测信道攻击和跟踪攻击。
Securing wireless communication remains challenging in dynamic mobile environments due to the shared nature of wireless medium and lacking of fixed key management infrastructures. Generating secret keys using physical layer information thus has drawn much attention to complement traditional cryptographic-based methods. Although recent work has demonstrated that Received Signal Strength (RSS) based secret key extraction is practical, existing RSS-based key generation techniques are largely limited in the rate they generate secret bits and are mainly applicable to mobile wireless networks. In this paper, we show that exploiting the channel response from multiple Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) subcarriers can provide fine-grained channel information and achieve higher bit generation rate for both static and mobile cases in real-world scenarios. We further develop a Channel Gain Complement (CGC) assisted secret key extraction scheme to cope with channel non-reciprocity encountered in practice. Our extensive experiments using WiFi networks in both indoor as well as outdoor environments demonstrate that our approach can achieve significantly faster secret bit generation rate at 60 ~ 90bit/packet, and is resilient to malicious attacks identified to be harmful to RSS-based techniques including predictable channel attack and stalking attack.