Persuasion with Limited Communication Capacity
Persuasion with Limited Communication Capacity
复制标题
沟通能力有限的说服
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3083932
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Tristan Tomala
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. L. Treust;Tristan Tomala
我们考虑一个贝叶斯说服问题，其中说服者和决策者通过一个不完美的渠道进行交流，该渠道具有固定和有限的消息数量，并受到外部噪声的影响。我们提供了说服者通过渠道沟通所能获得的回报的上限。我们还证明了上界是紧的，即如果说服问题由同一基本问题的大量独立副本组成，则说服者可以通过将所有问题捆绑在一起的策略来任意接近地达到这个上界。我们将这种最优收益描述为通信信道的信息理论容量的函数。
We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. We provide an upper bound on the payoffs the persuader can secure by communicating through the channel. We also show that the bound is tight, i.e., if the persuasion problem consists of a large number of independent copies of the same base problem, then the persuader can achieve this bound arbitrarily closely by using strategies that tie all the problems together. We characterize this optimal payoff as a function of the information-theoretic capacity of the communication channel.