Fiscal restraints by advisors
Fiscal restraints by advisors
复制标题
顾问的财政限制
DOI：
10.1007/s10101-013-0127-0
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Shun-ichiro and Kimiko Terai
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bessho;Shun-ichiro and Kimiko Terai
本研究探讨当财政顾问的任命由内生决定时，财政顾问在维持政府财政纪律方面的角色。我们的理论模型表明，在任政治家在意识到自己的能力水平之前，有动机聘请外部顾问作为财政纪律的承诺工具。这位顾问对公共支出起到了抑制作用，公共支出的作用是控制现任政客在离职后超支以换取选票。我们的经验分析在日本的情况下支持了这一假设，在日本，由中央政府担任董事的政府往往支出较少。
This study investigates the role of fiscal advisors in maintaining government fiscal discipline when the advisor’s appointment is determined endogenously. Our theoretical model shows that an incumbent politician has an incentive to employ an external advisor as a commitment device for fiscal discipline before being aware of his own competence level. The advisor acts as a restraint on public expenditure, which works to control the incumbent politician’s ex post overspending to buy votes. Our empirical analysis supports this hypothesis in the Japanese case where governments with directors from the central government tend to spend less.