Inequality, Redistribution, and Rent-Seeking
Inequality, Redistribution, and Rent-Seeking
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不平等、再分配和寻租
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00141.x
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Francisco Rodríguez
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Francisco Rodríguez
本文提出了一个非中间选民再分配模型，其中更大的不平等导致更低的再分配。利益集团和政治家之间就免税问题进行的讨价还价意味着，收入足够高的个人在均衡状态下不会纳税。因此，选民会将税率设定得足够低，以控制寻租的动机。不平等的增加，通过把更多的收入放在可以购买豁免的个人手中，将导致更低的均衡再分配。该模型可以用来解释不平等与增长之间的负相关关系，并为为什么在民主国家穷人不会剥夺富人提供了一个新的解释。
This paper presents a non-median voter model of redistribution in which greater inequality leads to lower redistribution. Bargaining between interest groups and politicians over exemptions implies that individuals with sufficiently high income will not pay taxes in equilibrium. Therefore, voters will set tax rates low enough so as to control the incentives for rent-seeking. An increase in inequality, by putting more income in the hands of individuals that can buy exemptions, will lead to lower equilibrium redistribution. The model can be used to account for a negative relationship between inequality and growth and provides a new explanation of why the poor do not expropriate the rich in democracies.