Excess Capacity and Pricing in Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets: Experimental Evidence
Excess Capacity and Pricing in Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets: Experimental Evidence
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DOI：
10.1628/093245613x666306
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发表时间：
2013-06
期刊：
影响因子：
0.4
通讯作者：
Miguel A. Fonseca;Hans-Theo Normann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Miguel A. Fonseca;Hans-Theo Normann
我们进行了实验，测试重复的伯特兰-埃奇沃斯双头垄断和三头垄断中的过剩产能与定价之间的关系。我们系统地在低产能过剩（暗示垄断）和无产能限制（暗示完全竞争）之间改变实验市场。控制企业数量后，更高的产能会导致更低的价格。然而，随着行业产能增加而导致的价格下降并不像纳什均衡所预测的那么明显，而且短视价格调整模型具有更大的预测能力。随着容量的增加，埃奇沃斯循环行为变得不那么明显，从而导致价格下降。默契共谋的证据有限，并且仅限于低能力的双头垄断。
We conduct experiments testing the relationship between excess capacity and pricing in repeated Bertrand-Edgeworth duopolies and triopolies. We systematically vary the experimental markets between low excess capacity (suggesting monopoly) and no capacity constraints (suggesting perfect competition). Controlling for the number of firms, higher production capacity leads to lower prices. However, the decline in prices as industry capacity rises is less pronounced than predicted by Nash equilibrium, and a model of myopic price adjustments has greater predictive power. With higher capacities, Edgeworth-cycle behavior becomes less pronounced, causing lower prices. Evidence for tacit collusion is limited and restricted to low-capacity duopolies.