Optimal negotiation of multiple issues in incomplete information settings
Optimal negotiation of multiple issues in incomplete information settings
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DOI：
10.1109/aamas.2004.205
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发表时间：
2004-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Fatima;M. Wooldridge;N. Jennings
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Fatima;M. Wooldridge;N. Jennings
研究了自利Agent之间的双边多议题协商问题。这种接触的结果取决于两个关键因素：议程（即，协商中的问题集）和协商过程（即，这些问题是一起讨论还是分开讨论）。在此背景下，本文分析了这样的谈判不同的议程和谈判程序。这种分析是在一个不完全的信息设置，其中代理知道自己的协商参数，但有不完整的信息，其代理人。我们首先确定两个谈判程序的均衡策略：逐问题和一揽子交易。在这些策略的基础上，我们确定了所有可能的议程程序组合的谈判结果和每个代理的最佳议程程序组合。我们确定这些条件下，代理人有相同的偏好超过最佳议程和程序，他们不，并为这两种条件下，我们显示的最佳议程和程序。
This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested agents. The outcome of such encounters depends on two key factors: the agenda (i.e., the set of issues under negotiation) and the negotiation procedure (i.e., whether the issues are discussed together or separately). Against this background, this paper analyses such negotiations by varying the agenda and negotiation procedure. This analysis is carried out in an incomplete information setting in which an agent knows its own negotiation parameters, but has incomplete information about its opponentýs. We first determine the equilibrium strategies for two negotiation procedures: issue-by-issue and package deal. On the basis of these strategies we determine the negotiation outcome for all possible agenda ¿ procedure combinations and the optimal agenda ¿ procedure combination for each agent. We determine those conditions for which agents have identical preferences over the optimal agenda and procedure and those for which they do not, and for both conditions we show the optimal agenda and procedure.