Changing Lives: Delinquency-Prevention as Crime-Control Policy
Changing Lives: Delinquency-Prevention as Crime-Control Policy
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改变生活：预防犯罪作为犯罪控制政策
DOI：
10.1097/01.chi.000235078.09791.2c
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发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
13.3
通讯作者：
R. Desai
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Desai
美国是一个极端的国家。我们拥有世界上最富有的公民，但我们的婴儿死亡率与发展中国家不相上下。同样，我们认为自己是世界领先的民主国家，然而我们的犯罪率不仅高，而且明显地沿着由收入、教育和种族界定的断层线。在政治上，我们民主的短暂历史的特点是钟摆从右到左再到后缓慢而稳定的摆动。这一点在我们处理犯罪问题的方法中尤为明显;主张预防和治疗的力量与主张惩罚和报复的力量之间一直存在着斗争。《改变生活》将预防犯罪作为一项可行的青少年犯罪控制政策进行了审查，将其置于减少犯罪方法的两个极端的平衡和背景下。简单地说，这本书介绍了预防作为犯罪控制概念的历史，什么样的工作，以减少青少年犯罪（什么不）的证据基础，成本效益研究的优势和局限性，作为一种工具的选择，使计划规划决策，预防的政治，以及谁应该作出决定，预防规划的风险青年。这本书写得很好，组织得很好，使它成为这场斗争中各种利益相关者的宝贵工具。在其核心，本书中提出的原则和思想可以松散地围绕决策的中心框架。这些材料可以被组织起来帮助我们解决以下问题：（1）我们如何决定我们关心什么样的结果？(2)我们如何决定什么会对我们关心的结果产生重大影响，而什么只是在政治上受欢迎，但本质上无效？(3)我们如何在几个可行的方案中进行选择，以实现有效的规划？（4）如何决定谁来做决定？格林伍德提出了明确和令人信服的数据和论点，为每一个这些决定。首先，他雄辩地指出，预防并不受欢迎，特别是考虑到我们目前的政治钟摆转向保守;它具有延迟效应，通常被认为是通过将资源集中在那些风险最高的人身上来奖励不良行为，并且缺乏对惩罚的足够重视。但他也指出，预防和治疗可以在惩罚和公共安全工作之间同时取得平衡。例如，这可以通过不同的机构（例如，卫生和人类服务与刑事司法）来实现，这些机构具有不同的权限，在频谱的各个非竞争领域中进行沿着规划。他还指出，如果我们使用正确的工具，预防可以作为政治上可行的手段来推销。然而，我们还必须注意平衡对预防概念的热情与现有的有效干预措施。进入科学。为了决定什么是有效的，并为获得资助的项目提供有效的论据，方法必须严格，研究必须重复，工作必须在科学界进行同行评审，我们必须避免让政治上受欢迎的项目保持活力的垃圾科学。举个例子，引用科学证据来支持加州的三振出局法，其中一个公民可以，在适当的情况下，因为偷了一个Twinkie而被终身监禁。然而，严格的科学
The United States is a nation of extremes. We have among the worlds most wealthy citizens, yet our infant mortality rates rival those of developing nations. Similarly, we believe ourselves to be the worlds leading democracy, whereas our crime rates are not only high but also clearly settle along fault lines defined by income, education, and race.Politically, the short history of our democracy has been characterized by slow but steady swings of the pendulum from right to left and back. This is particularly evident in our approach to crime; there has always been a struggle between the forces that advocate prevention and treatment versus those that advocate punishment and revenge. Changing Lives examines delinquency prevention as a viable juvenile crime control policy, placing it in the balance and context of both extremes of crime reduction approaches. Briefly, the book presents the history of prevention as a crime-control concept, the evidence base on what works to reduce juvenile crime (and what does not), the advantages and limitations of cost-effectiveness research as a tool of choice for making program planning decisions, the politics of prevention, and who should make decisions about prevention programming for at-risk youths. The book is well written and organized in such a way as to make it an invaluable tool for a variety of stakeholders in this struggle. At its core, the principles and ideas presented in the book can be loosely placed around a central framework of decision-making. The material presented can be organized to help us address the following questions:(1) How do we decide what outcomes we care about?(2) How do we decide what significantly affects the outcomes we care about versus what is merely politically popular but essentially ineffective?(3) How do we choose among several viable alternatives for effective programming? and (4) How do we decide who should decide? Greenwood presents clear and cogent data and arguments for each of these decisions. First, he eloquently points out that prevention is not popular, particularly given our current political pendulum swing toward the conservative; it has delayed effects, is often perceived as rewarding bad behavior by concentrating resources on those at highest risk, and lacks a heavy enough emphasis on punishment. However, he also points out that prevention and treatment can be balanced between punishment and public safety efforts simultaneously. This may be accomplished, for example, through different agencies (eg, health and human services versus criminal justice), with different purviews, having programming along various noncompeting areas of the spectrum. He also points out that prevention can be sold as politically viable, if we use the right tools. However, we must also take care to balance enthusiasm for prevention as a concept against available effective interventions. Enter science. To decide what works and to make effective arguments for programs to be funded, methodology must be rigorous, studies must be replicated, work must be peer reviewed in the scientific community, and we must avoid the kind of junk science that keeps politically popular programs alive. Take, for example, the scientific Bevidence^ that was quoted to support Californias Three Strikes laws, wherein a citizen could, under the right circumstances, be imprisoned for life for stealing a Twinkie. However, rigorous scientific