An Information-Theoretic Model for Side-Channel Attacks in Embedded Hardware
An Information-Theoretic Model for Side-Channel Attacks in Embedded Hardware
复制标题
嵌入式硬件中侧信道攻击的信息论模型
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Piantanida
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Éloi de Chérisey;S. Guilley;O. Rioul;P. Piantanida
利用信息论工具，建立了侧通道攻击的成功概率和达到给定成功率的最小查询次数之间的数学联系，该查询对任何可能的区分规则有效，并且攻击者一方具有最好的可能知识。该链接是查询数量的下限，这取决于跟踪和密钥之间的互信息。这导致我们推导出互信息的上界，这些上界是尽可能紧的，并且很容易计算。结果表明，在加性高斯白噪声的情况下，任何攻击的成功概率的界与信噪比(SNR)直接相关。这使得对任何泄漏模型的成功率的计算和预测都很容易。
Using information-theoretic tools, this paper establishes a mathematical link between the probability of success of a side-channel attack and the minimum number of queries to reach a given success rate, valid for any possible distinguishing rule and with the best possible knowledge on the attacker’s side. This link is a lower bound on the number of queries, which depends on the mutual information between the traces and the secret key. This leads us to derive upper bounds on the mutual information that are as tight as possible and can be easily calculated. It turns out that, in the case of additive white Gaussian noise, the bound on the probability of success of any attack is directly related to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). This leads to easy computations and predictions of the success rate for any leakage model.
影响因子：
2.5
作者：
Issa, Ibrahim;Wagner, Aaron B.;Kamath, Sudeep
通讯作者：
Kamath, Sudeep