Regret and instability in causal decision theory
Regret and instability in causal decision theory
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因果决策理论中的遗憾和不稳定性
作者：
James M. Joyce
安迪·伊根（Andy Egan）最近提出了一系列所谓的因果决策理论（CDT）的反例。在因果决策理论中，行为人被迫在因果不被认可的选项中做出决定，因此做出了他们知道自己会后悔的选择。我表明，CDT远非反例，而是完全正确地得到了Egan的案例。伊根不这么认为，因为他错误地应用了CDT，要求行体在处理完有关其行为因果后果的所有可用信息之前做出有约束力的选择。我解释CDT的方式是为了清楚地说明伊根错在哪里，这也解释了为什么他的例子不会对CDT理论构成威胁。我的方法与Frank Arntzenius提出的CDT修改有相似之处，但不同之处在于它赋予潜在遗憾的重要性。与阿恩岑纽斯的观点相反，我认为，面对伊根的决定，行为人可以理性地选择她知道自己以后会后悔的行为。所有的理性都要求行动者从认识论的角度最大化无条件的因果预期效用，这准确地反映了所有关于他们的行为可能导致什么的现有证据。即使在一些古怪的情况下，人们肯定会对自己的所作所为感到后悔，这种方法也会得出正确的答案。
Andy Egan has recently produced a set of alleged counterexamples to causal decision theory (CDT) in which agents are forced to decide among causally unratifiable options, thereby making choices they know they will regret. I show that, far from being counterexamples, CDT gets Egan’s cases exactly right. Egan thinks otherwise because he has misapplied CDT by requiring agents to make binding choices before they have processed all available information about the causal consequences of their acts. I elucidate CDT in a way that makes it clear where Egan goes wrong, and which explains why his examples pose no threat to the theory. My approach has similarities to a modification of CDT proposed by Frank Arntzenius, but it differs in the significance that it assigns to potential regrets. I maintain, contrary to Arntzenius, that an agent facing Egan’s decisions can rationally choose actions that she knows she will later regret. All rationality demands of agents it that they maximize unconditional causal expected utility from an epistemic perspective that accurately reflects all the available evidence about what their acts are likely to cause. This yields correct answers even in outlandish cases in which one is sure to regret whatever one does.