Capital Adequacy Regulation: In Search of a Rationale
Capital Adequacy Regulation: In Search of a Rationale
复制标题
资本充足率监管：寻找理由
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Douglas Gale
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Franklin Allen;Douglas Gale
资本充足率监管的理由往往直接或间接地来自于预防金融危机的需要。相比之下，我们认为，在没有福利相关的金钱外部性，银行将选择社会最优的资本结构本身，没有政府的强制。
Capital adequacy regulation is often justified, directly or indirectly, by an appeal to the need to prevent financial crises. By contrast, we argue that, in the absence of a welfare-relevant pecuniary externality, banks will choose the socially optimal capital structure themselves, without government coercion.