Disentangling Notions of Embodiment
Disentangling Notions of Embodiment
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理清具体化概念
DOI：
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
T. Ziemke
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Ziemke
具身性已成为认知科学许多领域的重要概念。然而，关于具体什么是具身，以及什么样的身体是什么样的具身认知所必需的，存在着非常不同的概念。本文提出并对比了四种不同的、限制性越来越强的具身概念，它们大致可以被描述为：（1）主体与环境之间的“结构耦合”，（2）“物理性具身”，（3）“类有机体具身”，即类有机体的身体形式（例如，类人机器人），和（4）“器官的体现”的自我造血，生活系统。
Embodiment has become a n important concept in many areas of cognitive science. There a re, however, very different notions of exactly what embodiment i s and what kind of body is required for what kind of embodied cognition. This paper identifies and contrasts four different, increasingly restrictive notions of embodiment which can roughly be c haracterized as (1) ‘ structural coupling’ between agent and environment, (2) ‘physical embodiment’, (3) ‘organismoid embodiment’, i.e. organism-like bodily form (e.g., humanoid robots), and (4) ‘organismic embodiment’ of autopoietic, living systems.