Open Loop Equilibria and Perfect Competition in Option Exercise Games
Open Loop Equilibria and Perfect Competition in Option Exercise Games
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期权行使博弈中的开环均衡与完美竞争
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Dirk Paulsen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Back;Dirk Paulsen
Grenadier（2002）为寡头垄断投资博弈定义的投资边界决定了开环策略的均衡。作为闭环策略，它们不是均衡，因为任何一家公司通过更早的投资可以抢占其他公司的投资，并剥夺增长选择权。完全竞争的结果是由闭环策略产生的，这些策略是相互的最佳对策。在这个均衡中，延迟投资的期权价值为零，所有企业都遵循简单的净现值规则。作者2009。由牛津大学出版社代表金融研究学会出版。All rights reserved.如欲查询，请电邮至：journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org。北京：清华大学出版社.
The investment boundaries defined by Grenadier (2002) for an oligopoly investment game determine equilibria in open-loop strategies. As closed-loop strategies, they are not equilibria, because any firm by investing sooner can preempt the investments of other firms and expropriate the growth options. The perfectly competitive outcome is produced by closed-loop strategies that are mutually best responses. In this equilibrium, the option to delay investment has zero value, and the simple NPV rule is followed by all firms. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.