Optimal Bundling and Pricing Under a Monopoly: Contrasting Complements and Substitutes from Independently Valued Products
Optimal Bundling and Pricing Under a Monopoly: Contrasting Complements and Substitutes from Independently Valued Products
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DOI：
10.1086/367748
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发表时间：
2003-04
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Venkatesh;W. Kamakura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Venkatesh;W. Kamakura
我们开发了一个分析模型或有价值，并解决两个问题的进口垄断：（一）应一对给定的互补品或替代品单独出售（纯组件），一起（纯捆绑），或两者（混合捆绑），并在什么价格？(ii)互补品和替代品的最优捆绑和定价策略与独立定价产品的最优捆绑和定价策略有何不同？我们发现，组合的边际成本水平和互补性或替代性的程度决定了这三个捆绑策略是最佳的。互补品和替代品的价格通常应高于独立估价的产品。
We develop an analytical model of contingent valuations and address two questions of import to a monopolist: (i) should a given pair of complements or substitutes be sold separately (pure components), together (pure bundling), or both (mixed bundling), and at what prices? (ii) How do optimal bundling and pricing strategies for complements and substitutes differ from those for independently valued products? We find that the combination of marginal cost levels and the degree of complementarity or substitutability determines which of the three bundling strategies is optimal. Complements and substitutes should typically be priced higher than independently valued products.