Communication and Monetary Policy

Communication and Monetary Policy
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DOI:
10.1093/oxrep/18.4.495
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发表时间:
2002-12
期刊:
Macroeconomics eJournal
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
J. Amato;S. Morris;H. Shin
J. Amato;S. Morris;H. Shin
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
J. Amato;S. Morris;H. Shin

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最近央行独立性增强的趋势,以及几个国家采取正式的通胀目标制,都突显了沟通政策的重要性。在这篇文章中,我们探讨了当公共信息既起到传递基本信息的双重作用,又起到更好地协调的焦点的双重作用时,公共信息产生的一些经济影响。更准确的公共信息是一把双刃剑。虽然它在通过协调来影响行动方面非常有效,但有时它可能过于有效,并从根本上协调行动。
Recent trends toward greater central bank independence and the adoption of formal inflation targeting by several countries have served to emphasise the importance of communication policy. In this paper, we explore some of the economic effects of public information that arise whenever public information serves the dual role of conveying fundamental information as well as serving as a focal point for better coordination. More precise public information is a double-edged tool. While it is very effective in influencing actions through coordination, sometimes it can be too effective, and coordinate actions away from fundamentals.