Global corporations and local politics: income redistribution vs. FDI subsidies
Global corporations and local politics: income redistribution vs. FDI subsidies
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.06.004
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发表时间：
2004-08-01
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Janeba, E
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Janeba, E
收入不平等被用来解释发展中国家在吸引外国直接投资方面好坏参半的现象。本文建立了一个理论模型，将收入分配的偏斜程度与东道国政府的FDI补贴意愿联系起来。大的偏态使得政府补贴的可能性更小，因为中等收入者更喜欢再分配。然而，很少的偏斜并不能保证外国直接投资。此外，如果经济变量的变化改变了政策制定者如何权衡外国直接投资收益和收入再分配，东道国政府可能会从积极补贴转变为无补贴，从而为传统的拖延故事提供了另一种选择。(C)2004 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。
Income inequality has been used empirically to explain the mixed performance of developing countries in attracting FDI. This paper sets up a theoretical model that links the skewness of the income distribution to a host government's willingness to subsidize FDI. Large skewness makes government subsidies less likely because the median income person prefers redistribution. Little skewness, however, does not guarantee FDI. In addition, host governments may switch from positive to no subsidies if a shift in economic variables changes how the policymaker trades off the FDI benefits and income redistribution, thereby offering an alternative to the conventional hold-up story. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.