Subjective Probabilities Need Not be Sharp
Subjective Probabilities Need Not be Sharp
复制标题
主观概率不必太高
DOI：
10.1007/s10670-013-9597-2
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Jacob Chandler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jacob Chandler
摘要
众所周知，经典的贝叶斯决策理论（也称为“夏普”）将信念状态建模为单个概率函数，在处理不可知论方面面临着许多严重的困难。这些困难导致了越来越流行的所谓的“不精确”的决策模型，它表示的信念状态的概率函数集。然而，在最近的一篇论文中，亚当·埃尔加（Adam Elga）支持一个假定的规范性顺序选择原则，他声称这个原则得到了夏普模型的证实，但没有得到任何有希望的不精确模型的体现。在首先指出埃尔加未能证明他的原则确实是由夏普模型唯一证明之后，我对它的可解释性进行了诽谤。我表明，轻微削弱的原则是满意的至少一个，但有趣的是不是所有的，品种的不精确的模型，并指出，埃尔加未能激励他更强的承诺。
Abstract
It is well known that classical, aka ‘sharp’, Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called ‘imprecise’ models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be borne out by the sharp model but not by any promising incarnation of its imprecise counterpart. After first pointing out that Elga has fallen short of establishing that his principle is indeed uniquely borne out by the sharp model, I cast aspersions on its plausibility. I show that a slight weakening of the principle is satisfied by at least one, but interestingly not all, varieties of the imprecise model and point out that Elga has failed to motivate his stronger commitment.