A Cryptanalysis of Two Cancelable Biometric Schemes Based on Index-of-Max Hashing
A Cryptanalysis of Two Cancelable Biometric Schemes Based on Index-of-Max Hashing
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DOI：
10.1109/tifs.2020.2977533
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发表时间：
2020-01-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Thiry-Atighehchi, Kevin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ghammam, Loubna;Karabina, Koray;Thiry-Atighehchi, Kevin
可取消的生物识别方案通过结合用户特定令牌和生物识别数据生成安全的生物识别模板。主要目标是创建不可逆的、不可链接的和可撤销的模板，具有较高的比较准确性。在本文中，我们密码分析了最近两种基于特定位置敏感哈希函数的可取消生物识别方案：高斯随机投影-IoM （GRP-IoM）和均匀随机置换-IoM （URP-IoM）。正如最初提出的那样，这些方案声称可以抵抗被盗令牌场景下的可逆性、身份验证和可链接性攻击。我们提出了几种针对GRP-IoM和URP-IoM的攻击，并认为这两种方案都很容易受到身份验证和链接攻击。我们还提出了针对grp - io的更好但尚未实用的可逆性攻击。在这两个方案的作者提供的相同数据集上验证了我们攻击的正确性和实际影响。
Cancelable biometric schemes generate secure biometric templates by combining user specific tokens and biometric data. The main objective is to create irreversible, unlinkable, and revocable templates, with high accuracy of comparison. In this paper, we cryptanalyze two recent cancelable biometric schemes based on a particular locality sensitive hashing function, index-of-max (IoM): Gaussian Random Projection-IoM (GRP-IoM) and Uniformly Random Permutation-IoM (URP-IoM). As originally proposed, these schemes were claimed to be resistant against reversibility, authentication, and linkability attacks under the stolen token scenario. We propose several attacks against GRP-IoM and URP-IoM, and argue that both schemes are severely vulnerable against authentication and linkability attacks. We also propose better, but not yet practical, reversibility attacks against GRP-IoM. The correctness and practical impact of our attacks are verified over the same dataset provided by the authors of these two schemes.