A Quantitative Evaluation of Payroll Tax Subsidies For Low-Wage Workers: An Equilibrium Search Approach
A Quantitative Evaluation of Payroll Tax Subsidies For Low-Wage Workers: An Equilibrium Search Approach
复制标题
低工资工人工资税补贴的定量评估：均衡搜索方法
DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.09.012
复制
发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
F. Langot
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Arnaud Chéron;J. Hairault;F. Langot
菲尔普斯[菲尔普斯，E.(1994)：“低工资就业补贴与福利国家”，《美国经济评论》，第84页，第54-58页。提出了实行低工资补贴政策的理由。自20世纪90年代中期以来，法国一直在试验这一战略。本文评估了这一政策对就业以及对产出和福利的影响。我们构建了一个均衡搜索模型，其中失业率、工资和生产率的分布都是内生的，它包含了工资公布和专用性人力资本投资。我们使用法国的数据估计了这个模型。数值模拟表明，即使最优最低工资较低，现行最低工资也可以通过增加培训投资来达到较高的生产水平。我们表明，当工资税补贴分布在很大的工资范围内时，工资税补贴对福利的促进作用大于最低工资的降低，以避免低生产率工作的专门化。
Phelps [Phelps, E. (1994): “Low-wage employment subsidies versus the welfare state”, American Economic Review 84, 54–58.] presented the case for a low-wage subsidy policy. Since the mid-1990s, France has experimented with this strategy. This paper evaluates the effect of this policy on employment and also on output and welfare. We construct an equilibrium search model incorporating wage posting and specific human capital investment, where unemployment and the distribution of both wages and productivity are endogenous. We estimate this model using French data. Numerical simulations show that the prevailing minimum wage allows a high production level to be reached by increasing training investment, even though the optimal minimum wage is lower. We show that payroll tax subsidies enhance welfare more than a reduction in the minimum wage when they are spread over a large range of wages in order to avoid specialization in low productivity jobs.