Third-party punishment as a costly signal of trustworthiness
Third-party punishment as a costly signal of trustworthiness
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DOI：
10.1038/nature16981
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发表时间：
2016-02-25
期刊：
影响因子：
64.8
通讯作者：
Rand, David G.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jordan, Jillian J.;Hoffman, Moshe;Rand, David G.
第三方惩罚（TPP）（1-7），其中未受影响的观察员惩罚自私，通过阻止背叛促进合作。但是，为什么个人要选择承担惩罚的成本呢？我们提出了一个博弈论模型的TPP作为一个昂贵的信号（8-10）的可信度。我们的模型是基于值得信赖的成本和/或收益的个体差异。我们认为，对那些值得信赖的人来说，收益最大化的人会发现TPP的净成本更低（例如，因为激励一些人值得信赖的机制（11）也通过TPP为阻止自私创造了好处）。我们表明，由于这种关系，它可以是有利的个人惩罚自私，以表明他们不是自私的自己。然后，我们实证验证我们的模型使用经济博弈实验。我们表明，TPP确实是一个值得信赖的信号：第三方惩罚者比非惩罚者更受信任，实际上表现得更值得信赖。此外，正如我们的模型所预测的那样，引入更具信息性的信号（直接提供帮助的机会）会减弱这些信号效应。当潜在的惩罚者有机会提供帮助时，他们不太可能惩罚，惩罚被认为是，实际上是，一个较弱的可信赖的信号。相比之下，即使在TPP也有可能的情况下，昂贵的帮助也是一个强烈和高度使用的信号。总之，我们的模型和实验提供了一个正式的声誉帐户的TPP，并展示了如何惩罚的成本可能会收回信号一个人的可信度的长期利益。
Third-party punishment (TPP)(1-7), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal(8-10) of trustworthiness. Our model is based on individual differences in the costs and/ or benefits of being trustworthy. We argue that individuals for whom trustworthiness is payoff-maximizing will find TPP to be less net costly (for example, because mechanisms(11) that incentivize some individuals to be trustworthy also create benefits for deterring selfishness via TPP). We show that because of this relationship, it can be advantageous for individuals to punish selfishness in order to signal that they are not selfish themselves. We then empirically validate our model using economic game experiments. We show that TPP is indeed a signal of trustworthiness: third-party punishers are trusted more, and actually behave in a more trustworthy way, than non-punishers. Furthermore, as predicted by our model, introducing a more informative signal-the opportunity to help directly-attenuates these signalling effects. When potential punishers have the chance to help, they are less likely to punish, and punishment is perceived as, and actually is, a weaker signal of trustworthiness. Costly helping, in contrast, is a strong and highly used signal even when TPP is also possible. Together, our model and experiments provide a formal reputational account of TPP, and demonstrate how the costs of punishing may be recouped by the long-run benefits of signalling one's trustworthiness.