Insecurity of an efficient certificateless aggregate signature with constant pairing computations
Insecurity of an efficient certificateless aggregate signature with constant pairing computations
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ins.2013.09.032
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发表时间：
2014-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
De-biao He;M. Tian;Jianhua Chen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
De-biao He;M. Tian;Jianhua Chen
最近，Xiong et al. [H. Xiong，Z.关氏Z. Chen，F. Li，An efficient certificateless aggregate signature with constant pairing computations，Information Science 219（2013）225-235]提出了一种无证书签名（certificateless signature，CLS）方案，并利用该方案构造了一种具有常数配对计算的无证书聚合签名（certificateless aggregate signature，CLAS）方案。他们证明了他们的两个方案在计算Diffie-Hellman假设下的随机预言模型中是可证明安全的。不幸的是，通过给出具体的攻击，我们证明了他们的方案对于II型对手来说并不安全，即II型对手可以伪造任何消息的法律的签名。
Recently, Xiong et al. [H. Xiong, Z. Guan, Z. Chen, F. Li, An efficient certificateless aggregate signature with constant pairing computations, Information Science 219 (2013) 225–235] proposed a certificateless signature (CLS) scheme and used it to construct a certificateless aggregate signature (CLAS) scheme with constant pairing computations. They demonstrated that both of their schemes are provably secure in the random oracle model under the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption. Unfortunately, by giving concrete attack, we demonstrate that their schemes are not secure against the Type II adversary, i.e. a Type II adversary could forge a legal signature of any message.