FDI Policy, Greenfield Investment and Cross-border Mergers
FDI Policy, Greenfield Investment and Cross-border Mergers
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9396.2011.00984.x
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发表时间：
2011-11-01
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Wang, Shengzu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Qiu, Larry D.;Wang, Shengzu
本文考察了跨国公司通过对外直接投资进入他国并面临东道国的直接投资政策时，在格林菲尔德投资和跨国并购之间的选择。格林菲尔德投资产生固定的工厂设置成本，而外国公司在FDI政策的限制下只能从跨国并购中获得共同利润的一部分。这种权衡受到市场需求、成本差异和市场竞争等因素的影响。东道国政府选择其对外直接投资政策，影响（或改变）跨国公司的进入模式，以实现本国社会福利的最大化。我们描述了形成最佳外国直接投资政策的条件，并对发展中国家和发达国家的外国直接投资模式提供了直观的认识。
This paper examines a multinational's choice between greenfield investment and cross-border merger when it enters another country via foreign direct investment (FDI) and faces the host country's FDI policy. Greenfield investment incurs a fixed plant setup cost, whereas the foreign firm obtains only a share of the joint profit from a cross-border merger under the restriction of the FDI policy. This trade-off is affected by market demand, cost differential, and market competition, among other things. The host country's government chooses its FDI policy to affect (or alter) the multinational's entry mode to achieve the maximum social welfare for the domestic country. We characterize the conditions shaping the optimal FDI policy and offer intuitions on FDI patterns in developing and developed countries.