Rational consumer decisions in a peak time rebate program
Rational consumer decisions in a peak time rebate program
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高峰时段返利计划中的理性消费者决策
DOI：
10.1016/j.epsr.2016.11.001
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
F. Ruiz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
José Vuelvas;F. Ruiz
当用户参与高峰时间折扣（PTR）机制时，分析了消费者的理性行为，该机制是基于基线的需求响应（DR）激励计划。从需求方的角度提出了一个多阶段随机规划模型，以理解理性决策。消费者的偏好被建模为一个风险厌恶的功能下添加剂的不确定性。用户选择最佳的消费配置文件，以最大限度地提高他的经济效益，为每个时期。随机优化问题在时间上向后求解。当系统运营商（SO）使用前一个时间间隔的消费量作为DR程序的家庭特定基线时，会出现一种特殊情况。研究发现，当存在经济激励时，理性的消费者会改变基线以增加幸福感。因此，无论激励是否低于零售价格，用户都将其负载需求转移到基线设置时段。另一方面，如果激励大于常规能量价格，则最优决策是用户在基线设置时段中花费最大可能的能量，并且在PTR时间减少消耗。考虑到所有时期，这种消费者行为总共产生更多的能源消耗。此外，当激励低于零售价格时，能量模式具有高不确定性的用户应该比可预测的消费者花费更少的能量。
A rational behavior of a consumer is analyzed when the user participates in a peak time rebate (PTR) mechanism, which is a demand response (DR) incentive program based on a baseline. A multi-stage stochastic programming is proposed from the demand side in order to understand the rational decisions. The consumer preferences are modeled as a risk-averse function under additive uncertainty. The user chooses the optimal consumption profile to maximize his economic benefits for each period. The stochastic optimization problem is solved backward in time. A particular situation is developed when the system operator (SO) uses consumption of the previous interval as the household-specific baseline for the DR program. It is found that a rational consumer alters the baseline in order to increase the well-being when there is an economic incentive. As results, whether the incentive is lower than the retail price, the user shifts his load requirement to the baseline setting period. On the other hand, if the incentive is greater than the regular energy price, the optimal decision is that the user spends the maximum possible energy in the baseline setting period and reduces the consumption at the PTR time. This consumer behavior produces more energy consumption in total considering all periods. In addition, the user with high uncertainty level in his energy pattern should spend less energy than a predictable consumer when the incentive is lower than the retail price.