Truthmakers and the disjunction thesis
Truthmakers and the disjunction thesis
复制标题
真理制造者和析取命题
作者：
S. Read
最近，真理的对应理论以Truthmaker公理的形式经历了某种复兴：无论什么是真的，都有某种东西使它成为真的。我们考虑了各种各样的假设，这些假设已经被提出来表征真理制造，特别是分离命题（DT），即无论什么使一个分离为真，都必须使一个或另一个分离为真。结合某些其他假设，DT导致了琐碎性。我们表明，DT持有真理制造的详细说明（因此必须采取措施避免琐碎）；但还有更合理的关于真相制造的说法，而DT却没有做到。
The correspondence theory of truth has experienced something of a revival recently in the form of the Truthmaker Axiom: whatever is true, something makes it true. We consider various postulates which have been proposed to characterize truthmaking, in particular, the Disjunction Thesis (DT), that whatever makes a disjunction true must make one or other disjunct true. In conjunction with certain other assumptions, DT leads to triviality. We show that there are elaborations of truthmaking on which DT holds (which must therefore take steps to avoid the triviality); but that there are more plausible accounts of truthmaking on which DT fails.