The Performance Paradox in the Public Sector
The Performance Paradox in the Public Sector
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DOI：
10.1080/15309576.2002.11643661
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发表时间：
2002-03
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Sandra van Thiel;F. Leeuw
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sandra van Thiel;F. Leeuw
行政改革已导致在公共部门大量增加使用业绩评估工具。然而，这也导致了一些意想不到的后果，比如性能悖论、视野狭窄和“分析瘫痪”。这些意想不到的结果可能会降低有关实际性能水平的知识的质量，甚至会对性能产生负面影响。在所有政策部门都可以找到这样的例子。作者认为，公共部门的某些特征——如模棱两可的政策目标、街头官僚的自由裁量权、服务的同时生产和消费以及成本和收入的脱节——无意或有意地增加了绩效悖论的风险。因此，业绩评估应考虑到公共部门的特点，并制订能够处理有争议的和多种业绩指标的制度，在“衡量压力”的程度上取得平衡，并尽量减少不正常的影响。
Administrative reform has led to a strong increase in the use of performance assessment instruments in the public sector. However, this has also led to several unintended consequences, such as the performance paradox, tunnel vision, and “analysis paralysis.” These unintended consequences can reduce the quality of the knowledge about actual levels of performance or even negatively affect performance. Examples can be found in all policy sectors. The authors argue that certain characteristics of the public sector–such as ambiguous policy objectives, discretionary authority of street–level bureaucrats, simultaneous production and consumption of services, and the disjunction of costs and revenues–increase the risk of a performance paradox, either unintentionally or deliberately. Performance assessment should therefore take the special characteristics of the public sector into account and develop systems that can handle contested and multiple performance indicators, striking a balance in the degree of “measure pressure” and minimizing dysfunctional effects.