The Colombian Paradox: Peace Processes, Elite Divisions & Popular Plebiscites
The Colombian Paradox: Peace Processes, Elite Divisions & Popular Plebiscites
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哥伦比亚悖论：和平进程、精英阶层
作者：
Aila M. Matanock;Miguel García
结束国内冲突是困难的，尤其是通过政治解决。现在，冲突经常发生在有选举的州，选民有时会直接参与这一进程，可能是为了克服精英阶层的分歧。然而，根据哥伦比亚2016年全民公投的证据，全民公投和其他由选民直接批准的工具似乎放大了精英阶层的分歧，因此不是以这种方式加强和平进程的有用机制。相反，专注于传统的精英领导的谈判，寻求满足每个派别的要求，可能更有可能产生签署的和解协议，尽管哥伦比亚的案例也表明，一些替代形式的包容性可能有助于提高谈判进程的整体合法性，并提高执行的可能性。
Ending civil conflict is difficult, particularly through political settlements. Conflicts now often occur in states with elections, and voters have sometimes been directly involved in the process, potentially in efforts to overcome elite divisions. Yet, according to evidence from the 2016 popular plebiscite in Colombia, referendums and other tools of direct approval by voters seem to amplify elite divisions and therefore are not a useful mechanism to strengthen peace processes in this way. Focusing instead on traditional elite-led negotiations that seek to satisfy each faction may have a better chance of producing signed settlements, although the Colombian case also suggests some alternative forms of inclusivity that may help increase the overall legitimacy of the process and improve the odds of implementation.