Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of International Securities Regulation
Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of International Securities Regulation
复制标题
游戏佣金玩法：国际证券监管的 2x2 游戏
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Licht
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Licht
近年来，证券市场国际化的步伐加快，范围扩大。面对现代股票市场日益复杂的情况，各国证券监管机构认识到需要加强合作，目前正在进行各种努力，以实现证券监管方面的国际合作。然而，当今股票市场的现实是激烈的国际竞争，因此，证券监管机构在国际范围内面临两个问题。第一个因素是根本的动机，不与其同事合作，因为这种合作可能会损害其国家在国际市场上的竞争地位。第二个问题是，坚持竞争动态实际上可能损害其国家的利益。本文提出了一个新的，更广泛的视角来看待国际证券监管。它认为，在分析国际证券监管，囚犯的困境是一个有用的范式，在实践中出现的只有少数问题。在其他许多情况下，其他2x2博弈模型更好地描述了各国面临的冲突局势，并有助于评估国际合作的前景。本文提供了一个独特的整合的见解来自三个不同的来源：公司治理和证券监管理论，标准博弈论建模，国际关系和制度理论分析。本文考察了证券监管的三个基本主题-信息披露、反欺诈和内幕交易，并将国家政策转化为2x2博弈中的有序偏好顺序。重点贯穿于监管合作证券监管机构在达成可持续协议时面临的问题以及可能促进合作的国际制度。
In recent years, the internationalization of securities markets has accelerated in pace and broadened in scope. Faced with the growing complexity of modern stock markets, national securities regulators have recognized the need for greater cooperation, and a variety of efforts to achieve international cooperation in securities regulation is currently under way. The reality of today's stock markets, however, is one of fierce international competition, and securities regulators thus face two problems in the international context. The first is the fundamental incentive not to cooperate with their colleagues to the extent that such cooperation might undermine their country's competitive position in the international markets. The second problem is that adhering to the competitive dynamics may, in fact, operate to the detriment of their country's interests. This Article suggests a new, broader perspective for looking at international securities regulation. It argues that in analyzing international securities regulation, the Prisoners' Dilemma is a useful paradigm in only a few of the problems that arise in practice. In many others, other 2x2 game models better depict the conflictual situation that countries face and help to assess the prospects of international cooperation. The Article offers a unique integration of insights coming from three different sources: theories of corporate governance and securities regulation, standard game theory modeling, and international relations and regime theory analysis. The Article examines three fundamental subjects of securities regulation-disclosure, antifraud, and insider trading-and transforms states' policies into ordinal preference orders in 2x2 games. The emphasis throughout is on regulatory cooperation-on the problems securities regulator face in reaching sustainable agreement and on the international regimes that may facilitate cooperation.