Evolution of cooperation by phenotypic similarity
Evolution of cooperation by phenotypic similarity
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.0902528106
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发表时间：
2009-05-26
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Nowak, Martin A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Antal, Tibor;Ohtsuki, Hisashi;Nowak, Martin A.
自私个体群体中合作的出现是一个迷人的话题，激发了理论生物学的许多工作。在这里，我们研究的合作模式，其中个人的特点是由表型属性，是可见的其他人的演变。在这个意义上，群体是很好的混合，每个人都有可能与其他人互动，但行为策略可能取决于表型空间中的距离。我们研究合作者和背叛者的相互作用。在我们的模型中，合作者与那些相似而有缺陷的人合作。叛逃者总是会叛逃。个体突变为附近的表型，这在表型空间中产生群体的随机游走。我们的分析汇集了合并理论和进化博弈动力学的思想。我们得到了自然选择有利于合作者而不是背叛者的精确条件。当表型突变率大而策略突变率小时，合作是有利的。在合作者的最佳情况下，在一维表型空间和大群体规模中，临界效益成本比由B/c = 1 + 2/root 3给出。我们还得到了任何两策略对称博弈的基本条件，并考虑了高维表型空间。
The emergence of cooperation in populations of selfish individuals is a fascinating topic that has inspired much work in theoretical biology. Here, we study the evolution of cooperation in a model where individuals are characterized by phenotypic properties that are visible to others. The population is well mixed in the sense that everyone is equally likely to interact with everyone else, but the behavioral strategies can depend on distance in phenotype space. We study the interaction of cooperators and defectors. In our model, cooperators cooperate with those who are similar and defect otherwise. Defectors always defect. Individuals mutate to nearby phenotypes, which generates a random walk of the population in phenotype space. Our analysis brings together ideas from coalescence theory and evolutionary game dynamics. We obtain a precise condition for natural selection to favor cooperators over defectors. Cooperation is favored when the phenotypic mutation rate is large and the strategy mutation rate is small. In the optimal case for cooperators, in a one-dimensional phenotype space and for large population size, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is given by b/c = 1 + 2/root 3. We also derive the fundamental condition for any two-strategy symmetric game and consider high-dimensional phenotype spaces.