Strategic Delay in Bargaining
Strategic Delay in Bargaining
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DOI：
10.2307/2297563
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发表时间：
1987-07
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Anat R. Admati;Motty Perry
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Anat R. Admati;Motty Perry
本文分析了一个不完全信息的讨价还价模型，其中报价间隔时间是一个内生的策略变量。我们发现均衡涉及的延迟协议，这是由于使用的讨价还价的战略时间延迟，以信号他们的相对实力。在参数的某些规定下，时滞存在于唯一的序列均衡中，其信念满足一个直观的限制。这种延迟不会随着报价之间的最短时间变短而消失。
This paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable. We find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength. Under some specifications of the parameters, delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction. This delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small.