Uncertainty in Interdependent Security Games
Uncertainty in Interdependent Security Games
复制标题
相互依存的安全博弈的不确定性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Chuang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Benjamin Johnson;Jens Grossklags;Nicolas Christin;J. Chuang
即使是动机最好的信息安全模型，由于涉及风险的固有不确定性，也有应用局限性。本文阐述了一种形式化的机制来解决这种不确定性的相互依赖的安全（IDS）的情况下。我们专注于一个单一的IDS模型，涉及计算机网络，并适应该模型来捕捉一个概念，玩家只有一个非常粗略的想法的安全威胁和潜在的结构性后果。我们正式解决不确定性的风险参数的概率分布，这是共同的知识，所有的球员。为了说明这种方法可能会产生富有成效的应用程序，我们假设一个动机良好的分布，计算贝叶斯纳什均衡和倾斜条件的衍生模型，并比较这些与原始IDS模型的类似条件。
Even the most well-motivated models of information security have application limitations due to the inherent uncertainties involving risk. This paper exemplifies a formal mechanism for resolving this kind of uncertainty in interdependent security (IDS) scenarios. We focus on a single IDS model involving a computer network, and adapt the model to capture a notion that players have only a very rough idea of security threats and underlying structural ramifications. We formally resolve uncertainty by means of a probability distribution on risk parameters that is common knowledge to all players. To illustrate how this approach might yield fruitful applications, we postulate a well-motivated distribution, compute Bayesian Nash equilibria and tipping conditions for the derived model, and compare these with the analogous conditions for the original IDS model.