Fine-Grained Cryptography Revisited
Fine-Grained Cryptography Revisited
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DOI：
10.1007/s00145-021-09390-3
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发表时间：
2019-12
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
Shohei Egashira;Yuyu Wang;Keisuke Tanaka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shohei Egashira;Yuyu Wang;Keisuke Tanaka
细粒度的密码算法是安全的，可以对抗具有有限资源的对手，并且可以由诚实的用户使用比对手更少的资源来计算。在本文中，我们回顾了Degwekar，Vaikuntanathan和Vasudevan在Crypto 2016中关于细粒度密码学的结果，并展示了三个关键的基本细粒度密码原语的构造：单向置换族，哈希证明系统（这反过来又意味着针对选择chiphertext攻击的公钥加密方案）和陷门单向函数。我们所有的构造都是可计算的，并且在广泛认为的最坏情况假设下，对（非均匀）电路是安全的。
Fine-grained cryptographic primitivesare secure against adversaries with bounded resources and can be computed by honest users with less resources than the adversaries. In this paper, we revisit the results by Degwekar, Vaikuntanathan, and Vasudevan in Crypto 2016 on fine-grained cryptography and show constructions of three key fundamental fine-grained cryptographic primitives:one-way permutation families,hash proof systems(which in turn implies apublic-key encryption scheme against chosen chiphertext attacks), andtrapdoor one-way functions. All of our constructions are computable inand secure against (non-uniform)circuits under the widely believed worst-case assumption.