A Realist Reply

A Realist Reply
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现实主义的回答

DOI:
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发表时间:
1995
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
J. Mearsheimer
J. Mearsheimer
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
J. Mearsheimer

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《虚假的承诺》一书提出的核心问题是直截了当的,在国际关系文献中得到了广泛认可:国际机构能否通过改变国家行为来防止战争?具体来说,制度是否能通过让国家避开均势逻辑,避免根据其相对权力地位的影响来计算每一个重要举措,从而推动它们远离战争?现实主义者的回答是否定的。他们认为,制度不能让国家停止充当短期权力最大化者。对现实主义者来说,制度反映了国家主要基于对相对权力的关注而对自身利益的计算;因此,制度结果总是反映了权力的平衡。现实主义者认为,制度对国家行为没有显著的独立影响。然而,现实主义者认识到,大国有时会发现制度特别是联盟对维持甚至增加它们在世界权力中的份额是有用的。例如,对美国及其盟国来说,通过北约来制衡苏联比通过一个不那么正式、更临时的联盟更有效。但北约并没有强迫其成员国违背均势逻辑。制度主义者的回答是肯定的。他们相信制度可以独立地改变国家行为。该观点认为,制度可以通过说服国家拒绝权力最大化的行为,并接受可能削弱其相对权力地位的结果来实现和平。简而言之,制度主义者和我之间的争论是关于制度是否可以对国家行为产生独立影响,或者制度结果是否相反
The central question raised in "False Promise" is straightforward and widely recognized in the international relations literature: can international institutions prevent war by changing state behavior? Specifically, can institutions push states away from war by getting them to eschew balance-of-power logic, and to refrain from calculating each important move according to how it affects their relative power position? Realists answer no. They believe that institutions cannot get states to stop behaving as short-term power maximizers. For realists, institutions reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on concerns about relative power; as a result, institutional outcomes invariably reflect the balance of power. Institutions, realists maintain, do not have significant independent effects on state behavior. However, realists recognize that great powers sometimes find institutions-especially alliances-useful for maintaining or even increasing their share of world power. For example, it was more efficient for the United States and its allies to balance against the Soviets through NATO than through a less formal and more ad hoc alliance. But NATO did not force its member states to behave contrary to balance-of-power logic. Institutionalists answer yes. They believe that institutions can independently change state behavior. Institutions can cause peace, so the argument goes, by convincing states to reject power-maximizing behavior, and to accept outcomes that might weaken their relative power position. In short, the debate between the institutionalists and me is about whether institutions can have an independent effect on state behavior, or whether instead institutional outcomes