Endogenous Preferences And Delegation In The European Union
Endogenous Preferences And Delegation In The European Union
复制标题
欧盟的内生偏好和授权
DOI：
10.1177/0010414002239371
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发表时间：
2003
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
S. Hug
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Hug
政府间和超国家行为者之间的相互作用是欧洲联盟(欧盟)机构生活的一个决定性特征。然而，这些行为者往往被认为是相互独立的，他们的自主性是在真空中评估的。这是有问题的，因为如果欧盟存在“内生偏好”这种东西，它恰恰是通过这种政府间和超国家行为者之间的相互依存表现出来的。目前，还没有一种制度主义的欧盟方法能够接受这一事实。基于一些非常简单的博弈论观点，我在本文中提出了“内生偏好”的理由，并讨论了它们对代表团问题的影响。一些粗略的经验证据支持这样的说法，即超国家行为者的偏好与选择或任命他们的行为者的偏好有关。同样，这里提出的分析表明，委托人和代理人之间政策观点的差异影响了对超国家行为者的授权偏好。
The interplay among intergovernmental and supranational actors is a defining feature of the institutional life of the European Union (EU). Too often, however, these actors are considered independent of each other, and their autonomy is assessed in a vacuum. This is problematic because if there is such a thing as "endogenous preferences" in the EU, it appears exactly through this interdependence of intergovernmental and supranational actors. None of the institutionalist approaches to the EU has come to grips with this fact yet. Based on some very simple gametheoretic ideas, I offer in this article a rationale for "endogenous preferences" and discuss their impact on issues of delegations. Some cursory empirical evidence supports the claims that the preferences of supranational actors are related to those of the actors who select or appoint them. Similarly, the analyses presented here suggest that preferences over delegation to supranational actors are influenced by differences in policy views between principals and agents.