Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation
Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation
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DOI：
10.1002/jae.987
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发表时间：
2007-12
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
J. Guasch;J. Laffont;S. Straub
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Guasch;J. Laffont;S. Straub
本文基于Guasch、Laffont和Straub（2003）研究企业主导的再谈判时使用的相同样本，分析了拉丁美洲基础设施特许合同中政府主导的再谈判。在将理论框架扩展到政府主动发起的帕累托改进和租金转移重新谈判都可能发生的多时期背景之后，我们开发了一个原始的工具变量策略来解决合同内生性问题并得出实证结果。虽然关于在授予特许权时设立监管机构的重要性和价格上限监管计划的脆弱性的一些主要见解没有改变，但在投资和融资的影响以及腐败变量方面出现了重大差异。我们提供的证据表明，在治理薄弱和政治机会主义的背景下，良好的监管框架尤为重要。版权所有©2007 John Wiley & Sons， Ltd
This paper analyzes government-led renegotiations in infrastructure concession contracts in Latin America, based on the same sample used in Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003) to examine firm-led renegotiations. After extending the theoretical framework to a multiple-period context in which both Pareto-improving and rent-shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur, we develop an original instrumental variable strategy to address the issue of contract endogeneity and derive empirical results. While some of the main insights concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes are unchanged, significant differences arise with respect to the effect of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. We provide evidence that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.