Signaling with Reform: How the Threat of Corruption Prevents Informed Policy-making
Signaling with Reform: How the Threat of Corruption Prevents Informed Policy-making
复制标题
发出改革信号：腐败威胁如何阻碍明智的决策
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Ian R Turner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Keith E. Schnakenberg;Ian R Turner
游说是腐败的一个潜在来源，但也是政策制定者的宝贵信息来源。我们分析了一个博弈论模型，该模型显示了腐败的威胁如何影响廉洁政客寻求游说者帮助做出更明智决策的动机。政客们面临着一个两难境地，因为选民不能总是分辨出一个政客是否允许接触游说者以招揽腐败或寻求信息。因此，一位廉洁的政客可能会拒绝与游说者接触，以表明她是廉洁的，即使这样做会阻碍她制定良好政策的能力。这一信号可能会降低选民的福利，这取决于丢失的政策信息相对于剔除腐败政客的价值。
Lobbying is a potential source of corruption but is also a valuable source of information for policy-makers. We analyze a game-theoretic model that shows how the threat of corruption affects the incentives of noncorrupt politicians to enlist the help of lobbyists to make more informed decisions. Politicians face a dilemma because voters cannot always tell whether a politician allows access to lobbyists to solicit corruption or to seek information. Thus, a noncorrupt politician may deny access to lobbyists to signal that she is noncorrupt even though doing so impedes her ability to make good policy. This signaling may decrease the welfare of the voters depending on the value of the lost policy information relative to the value of screening out corrupt politicians.