Responding to a Groundwater Crisis: The Effects of Self-Imposed Economic Incentives
Responding to a Groundwater Crisis: The Effects of Self-Imposed Economic Incentives
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应对地下水危机：自我实施的经济激励措施的影响
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
D. Ficklin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Steven M. L. Smith;Krister P. Andersson;Kelsey C. Cody;M. Cox;D. Ficklin
许多具有全球重要意义的地下含水层正面临相当大的压力，因为主要用于灌溉的抽取量超过了补给量。与此同时，地下水政策，以解决公共池资源损失仍然处于初期阶段。本研究分析了最近和独特的自下而上的努力，自我征收地下水抽取费在圣路易斯谷，科罗拉多。利用差异中的差异计量经济学框架，我们的研究结果带来了新的和直接的经验证据，在地下水政策中使用经济激励的辩论。我们发现，价格干预是有效的，导致地下水使用量减少33%，主要是通过降低灌溉强度。我们还发现，在更有限的程度上，人们正在远离缺水的作物，并减少了总体灌溉面积。鉴于财政激励措施可以在地下水公地的胁迫下产生大量的保护，基于价格的政策值得进一步考虑，因为灌溉者解决不断减少和变化的供水。
Many globally important groundwater aquifers are under considerable stress as withdrawals, predominantly for irrigation, outpace recharge. Meanwhile, groundwater policy to address the common-pool resource losses remains in its nascent stage. This study analyzes a recent and unique bottom-up effort to self-impose a groundwater pumping fee in San Luis Valley, Colorado. Utilizing a difference-in-difference econometric framework, our results bring new and direct empirical evidence to the debate on the use of economic incentives in groundwater policy. We find that the price intervention has been effective, leading to a 33% reduction in groundwater use, predominantly through reduced irrigation intensity. We also find, to a more limited extent, movement away from water-thirsty crops and reduced overall irrigated acreage. Given that financial incentives can produce substantial conservation within a groundwater commons in duress, price-based policies warrant further consideration as irrigators address diminishing and variable water supplies.