A New Provably Secure Authentication and Key Agreement Mechanism for SIP Using Certificateless Public-Key Cryptography

A New Provably Secure Authentication and Key Agreement Mechanism for SIP Using Certificateless Public-Key Cryptography
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DOI：
10.1016/j.comcom.2008.01.054
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发表时间：
2007-12
期刊：
2007 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS 2007)
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Fengjiao Wang;Yuqing Zhang
Fengjiao Wang;Yuqing Zhang
中科院分区：
其他
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fengjiao Wang;Yuqing Zhang

文献摘要

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会话发起协议（SIP）被认为是用于因特网上的呼叫的主导信令协议。然而，SIP认证通常使用HTTP摘要认证，这容易受到许多形式的已知攻击。提出了一种新的基于无证书公钥密码（CL-PKC）的未知双方安全认证和密钥协商机制SAKA，为SIP认证和媒体流提供了更强的安全保证，并且在CK安全模型下是可证明安全的。由于使用了CL-PKC，SAKA有效地避免了对大型公钥基础设施的需求，克服了以往方案中的密钥托管问题。
The session initiation protocol (SIP) is considered as the dominant signaling protocol for calls over the Internet. However, SIP authentication typically uses HTTP digest authentication, which is vulnerable to many forms of known attacks. This paper proposes a new secure authentication and key agreement mechanism based on certificateless public-key cryptography (CL-PKC), named as SAKA, between two previously unknown parties, which provides stronger security assurances for SIP authentication and media stream, and is provably secure in the CK security model. Due to using CL-PKC, SAKA effectively avoids the requirement of a large Public Key Infrastructure and conquers the key escrow problem in previous schemes.