A conditional defense of plurality rule: generalizing May's theorem in a restricted informational environment
A conditional defense of plurality rule: generalizing May's theorem in a restricted informational environment
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多元规则的条件防御：在受限信息环境中推广梅定理
DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00225.x
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发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
C. List
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Goodin;C. List
梅定理著名地表明，在两个选项之间的社会决策中，简单多数规则唯一地满足四个吸引人的条件。虽然这一结果经常被引用来支持多数决原则，但它从未被扩展到基于选项的成对比较的决策之外。我们将梅定理推广到多选项决策，其中选民每人投一票。令人惊讶的是，多数规则唯一满足梅的条件。这表明了对多数原则的有条件辩护：如果一个社会的投票程序只从每个选民那里收集到一张选票，那么多数原则就是唯一强制性的选举程序。为了说明这种说法的条件性质，我们还确定了一个更丰富的信息环境中，批准投票，而不是多元化规则，是由五月风格的参数支持。
May's theorem famously shows that, in social decisions between two options, simple majority rule uniquely satisfies four appealing conditions. Although this result is often cited in support of majority rule, it has never been extended beyond decisions based on pairwise comparisons of options. We generalize May's theorem to many-option decisions where voters each cast one vote. Surprisingly, plurality rule uniquely satisfies May's conditions. This suggests a conditional defense of plurality rule: If a society's balloting procedure collects only a single vote from each voter, then plurality rule is the uniquely compelling electoral procedure. To illustrate the conditional nature of this claim, we also identify a richer informational environment in which approval voting, not plurality rule, is supported by a May-style argument.